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LONG HAIR AND THE JUDICIAL CLIPPERS:
CAN WELFARE OFFICIALS
CONSTITUTIONALLY REQUIRE
APPLICANTS TO TRIM THEIR LOCKS
TO ENHANCE THEIR EMPLOYABILITY?
Individuals with long hair often find it extremely difficult to
secure employment though qualified to perform the work. Employers fear the adverse effect the individual's presence will have on their
business. Employers often refuse to hire the "long hairs" to perform
tasks not involving public exposure because they doubt the "hippies'" determination to hold a job on a long term basis.
If such an individual is a family man he may well be forced to
apply for welfare benefits under the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) program.1 As a condition to the receipt of aid
under the AFDC program, the unemployed parent must actively seek
employment during the period aid is received.' The AFDC regulations require the claimant be "available to work."3
This comment will examine the applicability of the "available
to work" clause to a long haired individual who refuses to cut his
hair in order to obtain employment. Can the local welfare department deny the claimant AFDC benefits employing the rationale that
by his refusal to cut his hair, the claimant has voluntarily removed
himself from the labor market and is not "available to work"?
This situation focuses attention on the ever-troublesome issue
of individual rights versus state interest in the administration of
public welfare programs. More precisely, to what extent may the
state's interest in regulation of public assistance programs dilute the
constitutional rights of the individual? 4
CODE §§ 11200-11488 (West 1966).
2 Id. § 11303 (West 1966). "Aid shall be denied to an unemployed parent and
his family if it is determined by the county department, in accordance with regulations of the department, that: (a) He fails to seek and to keep himself currently
available for employment as required by standards set by the department, or (b) He
refuses without good cause to accept part-time, full-time, temporary or permanent
employment without reference to his customary occupation or skill ..
a Id. § 11303.
4 Social Welfare-An Emerging Doctrine of Statutory Entitlement, 44 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 603, 604 (1969). "The legislature's function, after considering all the relevant information and possible approaches, is to formulate policy and establish legal
structures to deal with the problems of poverty; the legal system's function is to de1 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS

termine, in the various litigated situations which arise, whether the legislature has
overstepped its legal power to establish, regulate and condition financial assistance
to the needy . . . .. [Hereinafter cited as Social Welfare.]
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To balance the interests involved and to determine which shall
prevail, it is necessary to determine the precise state interest sought
to be advanced. It is also necessary to ascertain the degree of constitutional protection afforded the right to determine one's hair style
and decide if the protection attendant this right removes it from the
sphere of permissible state interference.
This conflict has been called by one authority "the foremost
political and legal problem of our time."'
AFDC:

WHEN, WHY AND

How?

The Aid to Families with Dependent Children program was established by the Social Security Act of 1935.6 Originally, children
of unemployed parents were not eligible for AFDC funds but were
brought into the program by later amendment.' The program provides for matching federal funds to those states which choose to
establish a state-wide AFDC program.8 A state is not required to
establish an AFDC program, but those who do so must obtain approval of the proposed state program from the Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare.'
This program reflected a new philosophy toward public welfare
in our society. Public welfare was elevated from a mere gratuity,
financed and administered in a haphazard fashion at the local level
to a position of paramount federal concern with a greater emphasis
on the importance of the individual.'"
The purpose of the AFDC program, as outlined to the states,
was twofold. First, the program sought to alleviate the immediate
physical needs of indigent persons through direct payments of
money." The second purpose was to instill in recipients the self confidence, personal independence and strength of family life necessary
to lift the family to a position of self-support and self-respect in
their community.' 2 This second purpose reflected an awareness of
5 Cowan, The Import of Social Security on the Philosophy of Law: The Protection of Interests Based on Group Membership, 11 RUTGERs L. REv. 688 (1957).
6 42 U. S. C. §§ 601-609 (1964).
7 Id. § 607.
8 Id. § 603(a)(1)(A).
9 Id. § 601.
1o Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74
YALE L.J. 1245, 1246 (1965). "The Social Security Act represented a departure from
this general welfare philosophy. The framers of the Act had a clear concept concerning
the 'right' to public assistance, and provided devices to protect these rights."
11 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1964). "For the purpose of encouraging the care of dependent children in their own homes . . . by enabling each state to furnish financial
assistance . ..."
12 Id. ". . . to help maintain and strengthen family life and to help such parents
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the necessity to do more than merely perpetuate the welfare problem. It embodied a commitment to seek means to eliminate the
dependency of a growing segment of our society. To accomplish this
second purpose, the AFDC program was keyed to employment. It
is required that the parent be involuntarily unemployed through no
fault of his own.'" The parent must also actively seek employment
while receiving benefits 4 and, if unemployable, must enroll in a
training program designed to prepare the recipient to join the labor
force. 5 It is obvious that a secondary function of the employment
emphasis of the program is to control the expenditure of public
funds.'" It must be emphasized, however, that the legislature's encouragement, indeed even coercion, of employment is primarily rehabilitative in nature. 7
California has instituted an AFDC program in accordance with
the federal minimum requirements. 1 8 California's program is administered by a State Department of Social Welfare' 9 and implemented
locally on a county basis.2 ° County Welfare Departments are established by the County Board of Supervisors. 2' The County Director
of Social Welfare, on behalf of the Board of Supervisors, has full
charge of the county department and responsibility for administering
and enforcing the provisions of the AFDC program."
The emphasis on employment manifest in the fededal program
is made binding on the county welfare departments through state
legislation. Statutes provide that eligible claimants must be available
to work and seeking employment, accept reasonable employment if
offered, and refusal is an adequate basis for denial of AFDC
23
benefits .

The rehabilitative character of employment manifested in the
federal program is reflected in the California AFDC program.
Self-support, when possible, is recognized as essential to preservation
or relatives to attain or retain capability for the maximum self-support and personal
independence .... "
13 Id. § 607 (2)(B).
14 Id. § 607 (2)(A).
15 Id. § 609(a)(3).
16 Id. § 602(a)(5). "A state plan for aid and services to needy families with
children must . . . (5) provide such methods of administration . . . as are found by
the secretary to be necessary for the proper and efficient operation of the plan . .. ."
17 Social Welfare, note 4 supra, at 626. "The new emphasis in conditions attached
to welfare benefits is on rehabilitation ... .
18 CAL. WaLE. & INST'NS CODE §§ 11200-11488 (West 1966).
19 Id.§ 10600.
20 Id. § 10800.
21 Id.
22 Id. § 10802
2.3 Id. § 11303.
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of home life and the legislature clearly indicates its intent to construe employment situations strictly to accomplish this goal. 4
Eligibility determinations are initially a county function.
Claimants, however, are provided review procedures to preclude
arbitrary county policy dictating administration of the welfare
programs. A dissatisfied claimant can make an informal request for
a prompt, fair hearing from the State Department of Social Welfare. 25
The hearing will be conducted by referees employed by the Department of Social Welfare or the director or his administrative advisor.2
The hearing is informal and the claimant may be represented by
counsel if he so desires. The claimant may request a rehearing
within thirty days of the decision and the application for rehearing
must be approved or denied by the State Director of Social Welfare
within ten days. 2 a Within one year from the date of the final administrative decision, the claimant is entitled to file a petition in the
Superior Court praying for a review of the entire proceedings upon
review is the exclusive
questions of law involved in the case. This
29
judicial remedy available to the claimant.
The provision for judicial review of the administrative process
is particularly valuable to the claimant. Administrative agencies and
their determinations reflect contemporary political pressures.80 Also,
"there is an administrative tendency to use the existing policy to
justify the action rather than to use the situation to question the
policy."'" When dealing with human rights, administrative agencies
need the guidance and clarification of issues which the law can
provide.

2

Under the traditional approach,83 public assistance was considered a mere gratuity, and as such could be granted, withheld, or
conditioned as the legislature desired. This approach, however, was
24 Id. § 11205.
25 Id. § 10950.

28 Id. § 10953.
27 Id. § 10955.

28 Id. § 10960.
29 Id. § 10962.
30 Reich, note 10 supra, at 1252. "Absent challenge, welfare administrators are
permitted broad areas of discretion in which they make the law by administrative
interpretations under the pressures of current public opinion-interpretations that may
be neither consistent from one jurisdiction to another nor in accord with the original
purposes of the legislation."
31 Wedemeyer & Moore, The American Welfare System, 54 CAL. L. Rav. 326, 342
(1966).
32 Reich, note 10 supra, at 1257. "[D]ecisions concerning human rights are too
important to be left to public welfare workers and public administration officials
without the aid of law. Law is needed to help them to see the issues clearly, to guide
them, and to strengthen their good intentions."
3 Social Welfare, note 4 supra, at 609.
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emphatically rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Sherbert v. Verner. 4 Existing review procedures afforded an AFDC
claimant now preclude the imposition of conditions to the receipt
of welfare benefits upon any terms the state desires.
Although elevated from the status of a gratuity, public assistance
is not considered a vested right. 5 It may be conditioned and classified
but "[a]ny legislative classification must be reasonably related to
the purpose of the statute in order to pass as constitutional . . .. '
The purpose of the AFDC program is more than support. The
primary goal is preservation of the family unit and the development
of a sense of purpose and self-importance in the family. The program
recognizes self-sufficiency as essential to accomplishment of this
goal. Thus, employment is considered crucial to the success of the
program. The financial assistance provided is considered temporary,
providing the necessities of life until the head of the family is able to
join the labor force. With this legislative intent in mind, we can
examine the "available to work" clause and determine the rationality
of its application to accomplish the employment purpose of the
program.
AVAILABLE

TO WORK

The term "available to work" is not defined in the regulations.
The term is given meaning through its interpretation by the county
welfare department subject to the review procedures made available
to the claimant.8 7
The most comprehensive interpretation of the clause "available
34 374 U.S. 398 (1963). Appellant, a Seventh Day Adventist, was refused unemployment benefits because she refused to accept employment which required Saturday

labor. The United States Supreme Court, reversing the South Carolina courts, ruled
the decision as to appellant abridged her first amendment right of free exercise of her
religion. The Court stated: "It is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of

religion and expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions
upon a benefit or privilege." Id. at 404.
35 Smith v. King, 277 F. Supp. 31, 40 (M.D. Ala. 1967). "It should be noted that

there is no vested legal right for, anyone to receive public financial assistance; neither

the United States nor the Alabama Constitution requires Alabama to grant financial
assistance to needy dependent children." Accord, County of Contra Costa v. Social
Welfare Bd., 199 Cal. App. 2d 468, 473, 18 Cal. Rptr. 573, 576 (1962). "An applicant
for public assistance . . has no vested right to such aid . . . ." Some authors have

taken the position that the needy person does have a right to assistance from the

state: "The idea of entitlement is simply that when individuals have insufficient resources to live under conditions of health and decency, society has obligations to

provide support, and the individual is entitled to that support as of right." Reich,
note 10 supraat 1256.
88 Social Welfare, note 4 supra, at 622-23.
87 Freeman, Able to Work and Available to Work, 55 YALE L.J. 123, 134 (1945).
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to work" is found in the Unemployment Insurance area. Availability
is made a prerequisite to the receipt of benefits under the Unemployment Insurance regulations as well as the AFDC program. 8 The
legislative intent to encourage employment in the AFDC program
is reiterated in the Unemployment Insurance regulations.89 The
processing and placement of unemployed parents is accomplished
through the joint efforts of the State Department of Unemployment
and the Department of Social Welfare.4 The facilities of the State
Department of Unemployment are used extensively to promote the
employment of AFDC applicants.41
Availability for work is defined by the courts as "availability
for suitable work which the claimant has no good cause for refusing.
[I]f the unavailability for work be involuntary and without
fault, a claimant may not be deprived of benefits. . .. "'I "Good
cause" is defined as "adequate cause, a cause that comports with the
purposes of the Unemployment Insurance code and with other
laws." 4 3 The courts are defining availability in terms of good cause
or adequate cause and emphasizing degree of fault and ability to
control the circumstances on the part of the claimant as determinative
of "availability."
Conditions or restrictions placed on one's availability by a
claimant are examined in terms of adequate cause. The court must
look to the entire fact situation to determine if a condition be "good
cause" for refusal of employment. If the condition is "not usual and
customary in that occupation, but which he may desire because of
his particular needs or circumstances," 44 it is often held not to be
good cause. Likewise, if the conditions "so restrict his willingness to
work that his services are rendered unmarketable, he has removed
himself from the labor market and is ineligible.1 4 It is said that

"a willingness to be employed conditionally does not necessarily
meet the test of availability. .

..

""

If the condition is imposed by the employer, not the claimant,
38 CAL. UNEP. INS. CODE § 1253 (West Supp. 1970).
39 Id.

§ 325 (West 1956).

40 CAL. Wz. & INST'NS CODE § 11302 (West 1966).
41

Id.

42 Garcia v. California Employment Stabilization Comm., 71 Cal. App 2d 107,

113-14, 161 P.2d 972, 975-76 (1945), quoting with approval fromHagadone v. Kirkpatrick, 66 Idaho 55, 56, 154 P.2d 181, 182 (1944).
43 Syrek v. California Un. Ins. Appeals Bd., 54 Cal. 2d 519, 529, 354 P.2d 625,
630-31 (1960).
44 Unemployment Compensation Comm. v. Tomko, 192 Va. 463, 466, 65 S.E.2d
524, 527 (1951).
45 Beaman v. Safeway Stores, 78 Ariz. 195, 198, 277 P.2d 1010, 1013 (1954).
46 Ellis v. Employment Security Agency, 83 Idaho 95, 96, 358 P.2d 396, 397-98
(1961).

SANTA CLARA LAWYER

[Vol. I11

at least one authority47 argues that the availability of the claimant
should not be questioned because he does not meet the condition:
Where employers refuse or are reluctant to hire an individual, suitable
job opportunities which the individual is qualified to perform and
which he is able, willing, and ready to accept may nonetheless exist.
Such refusal to hire a worker does not of itself render the work unsuitable or prevent him from legally performing the work. . . .While employers, for what they think is in their best interests, or for any reason,
may refuse to hire any worker, such refusal should not affect the availability of workers whom they refuse to hire, unless such refusal is re48
quired by law.

The author of the cited article categorizes married women,
individuals beyond a certain age, and members of minority groups,
as persons who may be precluded from the labor market by conditions imposed by employers but nevertheless must be treated as
available for employment. The reasoning is sound as applied to these
groups. They are members of a closed class which employers have
excluded from consideration. They have been excluded from the
labor market through no volitional act on their part and are powerless to meet the condition imposed.
However, the author attempts to expand the argument to
include those refused employment due to appearance, dress and
mannerisms. Here, the argument strains. If the appearance, dress
and mannerisms are not of the claimant's volitional act-i.e., dress
dictated by economic conditions-and he is powerless to escape the
condition, the reasoning above should apply. However, the author
herself requires that the individual "has done nothing volitionally
to lessen his chances of getting work."4' 9 Thus, if the dress or appearance is due to the personal preference of the individual and is within
his power to control, his exclusion is due to a volitional act on his
part. If this volitional act has the effect of violating a condition
imposed by the entire labor market, as opposed to a single employer,
it is apparent that the availability of the individual is destroyed
by the volitional act. He is available for work only upon the condition that he not be required to meet a condition imposed on the entire
remainder of the labor force.
The voluntary imposition of a condition on willingness to
work, which detaches the individual from the labor market and is
motivated by personal choice rather than necessity, will render
47 Freeman, note 37 supra.
48 Freeman, note 37 supra, at 133-34. Quoted with approval in Reger v. Admin.,
Unemployment Compensation Act, 132 Conn. 647, 649, 46 A.2d 844, 846 (1946).
49 Freeman, note 37 supra, at 133.
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the individual "unavailable for work" and, thus, ineligible for
benefits.5 o
The purpose of the "available to work" clause, as interpreted
by the courts, is to channel individuals into the labor market by
placing limits upon the discretion of the individual to act as the
determinative factor of his employment. 1 The clause is designed to
limit the conditions an individual may set upon his employment in
order to increase the labor market available to the individual. The
clause is directly related to the employment goal of the AFDC
program. The "available to work" clause operates exclusively to
promote employment. The rational relationship between application
of this clause and the goals of the program is evident.
LONG HAIR AND THE CONSTITUTION

In Dandridge v. Williams, 2 the United States Supreme Court
examined a Maryland AFDC provision which placed a ceiling on
the welfare grant. The Court emphatically stated that the Court has
no power "to second-guess state officials charged with the difficult
responsibility of allocating limited public welfare funds among the
myriad of potential recipients."5 3 In the area of economics and social
welfare, the Court will require of the state only that its regulations
and classifications bear a reasonable relation to a legitimate state
interest.5 4 The Court, in this case, extended to the public welfare
area the traditional constitutional standard employed in examination of business or industry.55 The Court will not interfere in state
his
50 Noone v. Reeder, 151 Mont. 248, 252, 441 P.2d 309, 312-13 (1968). "...
unemployment is a matter of choice rather than necessity and therefore he has not
been actively or genuinely in the labor market. Voluntary removal of oneself from
the labor market does not satisfy the requirement that an applicant for unemployment
compensation benefits is 'available for work' . . . ." accord, Leclerc v. Administrator,
Employment Compensation Act, 137 Conn. 438, 440, 78 A.2d 550, 552 (1951). ". . . a
claimant who limits his availability for work because of personal reasons unrelated to
the employment is not entitled to compensation."
51 Dwyer v. Appeal Bd. of Michigan Unemp. Comp. Comm'n, 321 Mich. 178,
182, 32 N.W.2d 434, 438 (1948). "The basic purpose of the requirement that a claimant must be available for work to be eligible for benefits is to provide a test by
which it can be determined whether or not the claimant is actually and currently
attached to the labor market .... The test suggested is subjective in nature. Whether
or not a claimant is in fact available for work depends to a great extent upon his
mental attitude, i.e., whether he wants to go to work or is content to remain idle."
52 90 S. Ct. 1153 (1970).
53 Id. at 1163.
54 Id. at 1162. "It is enough that a solid foundation for the regulation can be
found in the State's legitimate interest in encouraging employment . ..."

55 Id. "To be sure, the case cited and many others enunciating this fundamental standard under the Equal Protection Clause, have in the main involved
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public welfare regulation unless it is arbitrary and without rational

justification. The Court will retreat from use of the "reasonableness"
standard to examine the constitutionality of state action in the welfare area only when "freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights"5 6
are involved. If such freedoms are threatened, the Court implies it
will hold the state to a stricter standard. 7 The Court couches this
exception to the "reasonableness" test in terms of "Bill of Rights"
freedoms and "first amendment guarantees.""8 The implication is
clear that unless fundamental rights are endangered by welfare regulations, the Court will interfere only if the state action is demonstrably arbitrary.
This position clarifies and limits the Supreme Court's decision
in Shapiro v. Thompson.5" In Shapiro the Court invalidated a state
welfare regulation imposing a one-year residency requirement as a
precondition to receipt of benefits. The Court concluded the regulation impinged upon the right of interstate travel and was unconstitutional."o The Court stated that "any classification which serves to
penalize the exercise of that [constitutional] right, unless shown to
be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest, is
unconstitutional." 1 The Court appears to require a "compelling interest" on the part of the state when any constitutional right is proscribed. However, the bulk of the opinion clearly makes a distinction
between fundamental rights and other rights which may constitutionally be conditioned by the state. The Court clearly defines
state regulation of business and industry. The administration of public welfare assistance, by contrast, involves the most basic economic needs of impoverished human
beings. We recognize the dramatically real factual difference between the cited cases
and this one, but we can find no basis for applying a different constitutional standard."
(The traditional constitutional standard is set forth in Lindsley v. Natural Carbolic
Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911), as follows: "The equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment does not take from the State the power to classify in the
adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise of a wide scope of discretion
in that regard, and avoids what is done only when it is without any reasonable basis
and therefore is purely arbitrary;" accord, Flemming v. Nestor 363 U.S. 603, 611
(1960): "Particularly when we deal with a withholding of a noncontractual benefit
under a social welfare program we must recognize that the Due Process Clause can be
thought to interpose a bar only if the statute manifests a patently arbitrary classification, utterly lacking in rational justification.")
50 Id. at 1161.
57 Id. "For when otherwise valid governmental regulation sweeps so broadly as
to impinge upon activity protected by the First Amendment, its very overbreadth
may make it unconstitutional ....
58 Id.
5) 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
60 Id. at 629. "This court long ago recognized that the nature of our Federal
Union and our constitutional concepts of personal liberty unite to require that all
citizens be free to travel throughout the length and breadth of our land uninhibited
by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or restrict this movement."
61 Id. at 634.
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interstate travel as a fundamental right.12 Justice Stewart, in his
concurring opinion, also differentiates between a fundamental right
and a conditional personal right." The Court concludes its examination of the residency requirement as follows:
[E]ven under traditional equal protection tests a classification of welfare applicants according to whether they have lived in the State for
one year would seem irrational and unconstitutional. But, of course,
the traditional criteria do not apply in these cases. Since the classification here touches on the fundamental right of interstate movement, its
stricter standard of whether
constitutionality must be judged by the
64
it promotes a compelling state interest.

Dandridgeand Shapiro make clear the Court's extreme interest
in the probable consequence of the welfare regulation. If "Bill of
Rights" or "first amendment" freedoms are theatened, the Court
will require the state to exhibit a "compelling state interest" to justify state infringement of these freedoms. In other situations, the
Court will require only that the state regulation be reasonable and
non-arbitrary.
Thus, to determine the degree of state interest necessary to constitutionally justify limiting the individual's freedom of hair style,
it is necessary first to examine the degree of constitutional protection
afforded individual discretion in choice of hair style.
The individual's right to wear his hair as he so desires has been
a lively issue in recent years. United States federal courts have considered the issue frequently and come to surprisingly divergent con-

clusions.

5

Most of the cases considered have dealt with student

62 Id. at 630. The court quotes with approval United States v. Guest, 383 U.S.
745, 757 (1966): "The constitutional right to travel from one State to another ....
occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union."
63 Id. at 642-43. Addressing the right of interstate travel the court states: "This
constitutional right . .

.

.is not a mere conditional liberty subject to regulation and

control under conventional due process or equal protection standards. . . . [It is a
virtually unconditional personal right, guaranteed by the Constitution to us all."
64 Id. at 638.
65 For cases upholding the school's right to regulate the length of students' hair
see; Jackson v. Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213 (6th Cir. 1970) ; Ferrell v. Dallas Independent
School Dist., 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied 393 U.S. 856 (1968);
Pritchard v. Spring Branch Independent School Dist., 308 F. Supp. 570 (S.D. Tex.
1970); Farrell v. Smith, 310 F. Supp. 732 (S.D. Me. 1970); Neuhaus v. Torrey, 310
F. Supp. 192 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Crews v. Cloncs, 303 F. Supp. 1370 (S.D. Ind. 1969);
Davis v. Firment, 408 F.2d 1085 (5th Cir. 1967) ; Akin v. Bd. of Education of Riverside Unified School, 262 Cal. App. 2d 161, 68 Cal. Rptr. 557 (1968). Contra, Burnside
v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966); Reichenberg v. Nelson, 310 F. Supp. 248
(Neb. 1970) ; Calbillo v. San Jacinto Jr. College, 305 F. Supp. 857 (S.D. Tex. 1969) ;
Olff v. East Side Union High School Dist., 305 F. Supp 557 (N.D. Cal. 1969);
Richards v. Thurston, 304 F. Supp. 449 (Mass. 1969).; Zachery v. Brown, 299 F.
Supp. 1360 (N.D. Cal. 1967); Meyers v. Arcata Union High School Dist., 269 Cal.
App. 2d 549, 75 Cal. Rptr. 68 (1969).
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attacks on dress code regulations sought to be imposed by public
school officials. Despite the educational setting of the cases, the
basic issue is consistent with this discussion. Is personal choice of
hair style a constitutionally protected right and if so, what degree
of protection is afforded this right by the courts?
In Breen v. Kahl," the federal district court stated emphatically
that hair style is an ingredient of personal freedom protected by the
United States Constitution, and applicable to the states through the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The court noted
that ". . . to limit or curtail this or any other fundamental right the
state has a substantial burden of justification."O7
The high degree of constitutional protection evident in Breen is
reemphasized in Griffin v. Tatum. 8 In Griffin, the federal district
court stressed the importance of individuality to our society and
clearly indicated the suspicion with which the court would view any
attempt to proscribe an individual's freedom of hair style. 9 This
court also placed on the state a substantial burden of justification."
Hair length has not enjoyed uniform protection by the courts.
Many courts refuse to extend to freedom of hair style the degree of
constitutional protection of Breen and Griffin.7'
2 the
In Davis v. Firment,7
federal district court expressed doubt
that the wearing of long hair is symbolic expression and entitled to
constitutional protection. The court felt long hair does not express
an idea or viewpoint and, thus, is at best a meaningless symbol and
quite possibly not a symbol at all. 78 The court concluded that
"[e]ven if the wearing of long hair is assumed to be symbolic expression, it falls within that type of expression which is manifested
through conduct and is therefore subject to reasonable state regula'74
tion in furtherance of a legitimate state interest.

At least one court has concluded that the right to wear long hair
may be properly proscibed for economic reasons. In Farrell v.
66 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969).
67 Id. at 1036. Placing the burden of justification on the state is questioned in
Pritchard v. Spring Branch Independent School Dist., 308 F. Supp. 570 (S. D. Tex.
1970).

300 F. Supp. 60 (M.D. Ala. 1969).
Id. at 62. "The freedom here protected is the right to some breathing space
for the individual into which the government may not intrude without carrying a
substantial burden of justification."
8

89

70
71
72

Id.

Cases cited note 65 supra.
269 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. La. 1967).

73 Id. at 527.
74

Id.
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Smith,15 students at a vocational school sought to enjoin school officials from enforcing hair length regulations. The school defended the
regulations on the grounds that long hair was prejudicial to effective
job opportunities in industry and that the economic welfare of the
student is advanced through adherence to the grooming regulations.
The court denied the injunction, concluding that the economic considerations advanced by the school were sufficient justification to
enforce the regulations."
Crews v. Cloncs," best summarizes the opinion of the majority
of courts which have not afforded freedom of hair style a high degree
of constitutional protection. In Crews the federal district court denied
a high school student injunctive relief prohibiting enforcement of a
hair length regulation. The court classified hair style as conduct and
upheld the state's right to control this conduct upon showing of a
sufficient interest. The following comment from this court capsulizes
the feeling of many courts on this issue: "Little harm will result to
Plaintiff from trimming his hair-his opinions and beliefs, personality and individuality will still be his own."" 8
9 is one of the
Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School District,7
most frequently cited cases in the school dress code area. The federal
district court upheld the school's right not to enroll a student because
the length of his hair violated an established school regulation. The
court noted:

The Constitution does not establish an absolute right to free expression
of ideas, though some might disagree. The constitutional right to free
exercise of speech, press, assembly and religion may be infringed by
the state if there are compelling reasons to do so .... That which so

interferes or hinders the state in providing the best education possible
for its people, must be eliminated or circumscribed as needed. This
is true even when that which is condemned is the exercise of a constitutionally protected right.80

The Ferrell court did not decide that "hair style is a constitutionally protected mode of expression."" It only decided that "if"
this right is constitutionally protected, and is elevated to the level of
freedom of speech, it still may be proscribed upon evidence of compelling state interest. The court found this compelling reason in the
disruptive effect of the students with long hair on the remainder of
F. Supp. 732 (S.D. Me. 1970).
Id. at 738-39.

75 310
76
77

78

303 F. Supp. 1370 (S.D. Ind. 1969).
Id. at 1377.

'9 392

F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 856 (1968).

80 Id. at 702-03.
81 Id. at 702.
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the student body.8 2 Thus, the court found a compelling state interest
in regulation of hair length not because hair length is disruptive in
itself, but because it induces disruptive behavior by others.
It is obvious that if the Ferrellcourt had decided hair style was

not a fundamental right akin to freedom of speech, it would have
placed a lesser burden of justification on the state.
The Supreme Court of the United States has remained silent in
the school dress code cases. The Court's one reference to the hair
8
length issue is contained in Tinker v. Des Moines School District."
Petitioners were suspended from school for wearing black armbands
to protest Government policy in Vietnam. The Court granted the
students an injunction, concluding that this symbolic speech was
protected under the first amendment and since the school could not
show a disruptive influence due to the presence of the armbands, the
school could not proscribe the student's constitutional right. The
Court carefully pointed out, however, that "[t] he problem posed by
the present case does not relate to regulation of the length of skirts
or the type of clothing, to hair style or deportment. Cf. Ferrell v.
Dallas Independent School District 392 F.2d 697 (1968). ' ' 84
Thus, the Court granted at least tacit approval to the analysis and
conclusions of the Ferrell decision. Though not deciding the question of the constitutional status of hair style, the Court seems unwilling to categorically afford freedom of hair style the status of symbolic speech and invoke the attendant first amendment protections.
The Supreme Court has not yet defined "symbolic speech."
There is no available test by which to measure conduct intertwined
with "speech" or "expression" and decide if the degree of expression
involved requires first amendment protection.8" The Court will not
label all conduct tinged wth an element of expression, the status of
"speech. 8 8 Since the Court recognizes the concept of "symbolic
82 Id. at 700-01. From the evidence presented, the court decided the disruptions
which occurred when other students harassed and teased students with long hair were
sufficient reason to uphold the regulation.
83 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
84 Id. at 507-08.
85 Cowgill v. California, 78 Cal. Rtpr. 853 (1969), appeal denied, 396 U.S. 371,
372 (1970). The Supreme Court, denying appellant's appeal from a conviction for
mutilating the American flag by wearing a vest made from an American flag noted:
"The Court has, as yet not established a test for determining at what point conduct
becomes so intertwined with expression that it becomes necessary to weigh the State's
interest in proscribing conduct against the constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression."
80 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). "We cannot accept the
view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled "speech" when-
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speech" but refuses to extend the protection this concept entails to
all situations involving conduct and expression, the Court must apply some criteria to decide the cases before it.
The Court has recognized "symbolic speech" in such conduct
as "sit-ins,""7 wearing of armbands, s" and draft card burning." The
non-verbal expression, in each of these situations, was positive and
assertive. The conduct was outside the normal scope of activities of
the individual. There is little explanation for the participants' conduct except as an attempt to communicate an idea. The idea sought
to be expressed is sufficiently defined by the conduct to establish the
communication of the idea to the audience. Given the general context
of our society, most persons would easily associate a sit-in with segregation practices, wearing of armbands as sympathy with the cause
identified on the band, and a draft card burning as protest against
the Vietnam war and/or the draft.
The wearing of long hair, viewed in the terms discussed above,
presents a vague, uncertain situation."0 One's hair style is not assertive conduct, at least not to the degree of the wearing of an armband.
It can be explained as part of the individual's normal activity pattern. Communication of an idea is not the only plausible explanation
for such conduct. It may simply denote personal preference. The
wearing of the long hair may not sufficiently define the idea so as to
be communicative. 1 What idea is the actor trying to communicate
to his audience? A political belief? Economic? Social? The possible
inferences available to the audience are limited only by their imagination!
The point of the above discussion is not to deny long hair the
status of symbolic expression, but to illustrate that it is often impossible to decide the question limited to an examination of the conduct
ever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea." See alvo
Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 124 (1969); Giboney v. Empire Storage Co., 336
U.S. 490, 502 (1949).
87 Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1965).
88 Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).

89 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
0 Note, Symbolic Conduct, 68 CoLum. L. REv. 1091, 1112 (1968). "The wearing
of a beard or long hair, however, presents a fairly ambiguous situation. The subjective intent behind such conduct may be only a natural preference of personal appearance, and thus closely related to a normal activity pattern. In most cases the
actor will be attempting to express nothing to others. Admittedly, it is a part of
psychological character expression, but for the purposes of inclusion under the first
amendment, we are concerned with conscious acts of communication."
91 Id. at 1113-14. "If there is to be a doctrine of first amendment protection for
symbolic conduct, its cornerstone must be the requirement that others can recognize
the conduct as communication."
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alone. The answer must depend upon an examination of all the factors involved in the situation. A statement that the wearing of long
hair is or is not symbolic expression, divorced from the particular
factual situation at issue, is a legal conclusion influenced more by
emotion and prejudice than a logical application of the law.
If, after examination of all the circumstances surrounding a
particular factual situation, the court rules that the hair style is
not symbolic expression, then it is not deserving of first amendment
protection. Consequently, the state may properly regulate the length
of the individual's hair in the welfare area upon proving a reasonable,
non-arbitrary relationshp between the regulation and a legitimate
state interest. If the hair length is found to be symbolic expression,
the state may not proscribe this first amendment right unless required
to further a compelling state interest.
In United States v. O'Brien,9" the Court sets forth a four-part
test for determining whether a state regulation of "symbolic speech"
is justifiable. The test requires: (1) that the regulation be within
the constitutional power of the government; (2) that the regulation
must further a substantial governmental interest; (3) that the
governmental interest must be unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and (4) that the incidental restriction on the first
amendment freedom be no greater than necessary to accomplish the
desired result. 93
Even if, under the circumstances of a particular case, an
individual's hair length is found to constitute "symbolic expression,"
an examination of AFDC hair length requirements in light of the
O'Brien test should reveal that the incidental infringement upon the
92 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
93 Id. at 376-77. "This

Court has held that when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations
on First Amendment freedoms. To characterize the quality of the governmental interest which must appear, the Court has employed a variety of descriptive terms:
compelling; substantial; subordinating; paramount; cogent; strong. Whatever imprecision inheres in these terms, we think it clear that a government regulation is
sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the government; if it
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidential restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest." The Court applies this test in Tinker v. Des Moines
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). The Court recognizes the wearing of an armband
as symbolic speech, but also recognizes the substantial interest of the state in preserving the orderly operation of the school and accepts the state's right to proscribe
conduct which would be disruptive to the efficient operation of the school. In Tinker,
however, the state is unable to exhibit that the proscription of the wearing of armbands is merely an incidental suppression of free expression. The facts dearly show
the purpose of the school officials was to suppress the idea, not the conduct.
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individual's first amendment rights is constitutionally permissible.
The state clearly has the power to require employment, whenever
possible, as an alternative to the receipt of public assistance. The
Supreme Court has decided that regulations designed to promote
94
gainful employment are constitutionally valid. The "available to
work" regulation seeks to accomplish this objective. The "available
to work" clause as applied to individuals with long hair is totally
disinterested in the ideas which may be communicated in the manner
proscribed. Indeed, the claimant could espouse the ideas verbally
with no objections from the state. The regulation is not overly broad.
If the length of an individual's hair renders him unemployable, only
shorter hair will re-open the labor market to the individual. No less
restrictive regulation can be fashioned to accomplish the goal sought.
Finally, the state does have a substantial interest in the administration of its AFDC program. The state, reflecting federal policy,
considers self-sufficiency imperative to the establishment of a stable
home life for the family unit. Employment of the head of the household, with the benefits in terms of family pride and sense of purpose
which it instills, is crucial to accomplish the rehabilitative purpose
of the welfare program. The obvious cost in terms of human resources
resulting from a failure of the rehabilitative aspect of public assistance programs must render welfare programs of paramount concern
to the state.
CONCLUSION

The legislative intent of the AFDC program is preservation
of the family unit. 5 Employment is the major vehicle utilized by the
legislature to achieve this goal. The "available to work" condition
to receipt of AFDC benefits is directly related to the employment
goal of the legislature. Thus, application of this condition is directly
and reasonably related to the achievement of a legitimate state
interest.
The question whether the individual's long hair is "symbolic
expression" and deserving of first amendment protection must be
answered on a case by case basis. The author does not believe the
answer may be generalized. Because of its equivocal nature, the
wearing of long hair is not sufficiently communicative or definitive
of an idea to be considered symbolic speech without reference to
the entire context of the particular factual situation involved.
94 Dandridge v. Williams, 90 S. Ct. 1153, 1162 (1970). "It is clear that the
Maryland . . .regulation is constitutionally valid. . . . [A] solid foundation for the
regulation can be found in the State's legitimate interest in encouraging employment. ..
95 See, note 12 and accompanying text, supra.
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The state must carry the burden of establishing the relationship
between the length of the claimant's hair and his unemployability.
The state must establish factually that the labor market is closed to
the individual and that the length of his hair is the reason for this
rejection. If the individual could not find employment with shorter
hair, obviously the length of his hair is not the reason for his unemployment. It is due simply to a lack of jobs in the labor market.
Likewise, if positions exist in the labor market which the individual
with long hair could fill, but the jobs are presently occupied by others,
then length of hair is not the reason for the claimant's unemployment.
He is unemployed because of an inadequate labor market. The state
must establish that the labor market as a whole-both open and
occupied positions-is closed to the individual because of the length
of his hair.
The author believes this to be an extremely difficult burden
of proof for the state to meet. However, failure to establish this fact
will destroy the reasonableness of the state's application of the
"available to work" clause to the claimant.
If the state can meet this burden of proof, and the claimant's
long hair is not considered "symbolic expression," the state may
proscribe this conduct upon establishing a reasonable relationship
between the hair length regulation as applied and the state's legitimate interest in employment and a stable home life.
If, under the circumstances, the claimant's long hair is considered "symbolic expression," the state regulation must meet the
O'Brien" test before proscription of this first amendment right can
be allowed. The author believes the state can meet this test in the
context of AFDC hair length regulations.
It must be emphasized that the O'Brien test is applicable only
when the particular factual situation involves conduct intertwined
with speech elements. If the issue involved pure speech or religious
beliefs, the test is inapplicable. It is only because the Court allows
incidental restrictions on first amendment freedoms when the state
is furthering a substantial interest through proscription of conduct,
that the state can meet the O'Brien test.
James H. Wilson
00 See, note 93 and accompanying text, supra.

